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1. Introduction
Two recent books by European scholars, one early and one late in his career, grapple with
the issues of law, constitutionalism, and society in the globalized world today. One, The
Status of Law in World Society: Meditations on the Role and Rule of Law, is by Friedrich
Kratochwil, a German emeritus professor from the Istituto Universitario Europeo
(European University Institute) in Florence who is a founder and leading figure in
constructivist theory of international relations; the other, Constitutionalism in the Global
Realm: A Sociological Approach, is by Poul Kjaer, a Dane with a PhD from that same
Istituto Universitario Europeo and an habilitation in sociology of law from Goethe
University Frankfurt, Germany. The one (Kratochwil) writes from within and against the
discipline of international relations “as his prism” (at 12). The other (Kjaer) writes from
within and against a school of sociology of law spanning from Niklas Luhmann to its
reconstruction in the work of Gunther Teubner, Kjaer’s adviser, whose work now Kjaer in
turn reconfigures. One book (Kratochwil’s) is published in the Cambridge University Press
series Studies in International Relations; the other (Kjaer’s), published by Routledge, is
subtitled “a sociological approach.” One is written in a free, improvised style of
“meditations” with no central thesis, ideas left like luminous feathers strewn in a Tuscan
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wood; the other in a rather ponderous, Teutonic style of argumentation that at times
brilliantly unfolds.
Both books aim to address the role of law in the world today beyond the boundaries
of nation-states as captured in such tropes as “world society” (Kratochwil), “transnational
normative orders” (Kjaer), and “societal constitutionalism” (Teubner, Kjaer’s adviser).
Both are digestible, though not easy, books: Kjaer’s at 156 pages and Kratochwil’s at 291.
The chapters in Kratochwil can be read like self-standing essays that sporadically play off
each other and spool out from a single curious mind. 1 Kjaer’s monograph should be read
in a committed ride, at times a bit laborious, but worth the effort, one that itself builds from
a formidable body of an accumulating work. Both are important in grappling with the place
and role of law in international relations and social ordering in the context of globalization
and economic and social crises today. Although the authors write from different
disciplinary vantages, and although they do not directly engage each other, their books
should be viewed as necessary complements to understanding the prospects and limits of
transnational legal ordering through international law and functionally differentiated
transnational organizations. 2

2. Kratochwil and praxis
Kratochwil provides a self-critique of his expansive efforts in his preface where he
presages, “the Meditation resembles more an interior monologue than an explicit argument
. . . . [Some may find that] I, as the author, seem to engage in a seemingly autistic activity,
taking up themes and leaving them after a while unattended” (at xiv). The meditations,
labeled 1–9, reflect the author’s internal dialogues with others and himself, for as
Kratochwil would agree, there is no single author of ideas, but all ideas build on, take from,
interweave, rend, and splice each other. How captivating these reflections are, as we ponder
with him as if on a Tuscan hillside over a glass of dark, savory Brunello, rapt in erudite
conversation. The citations alone reflect a lifetime of learning, and to read all of them
would provide decades of delight for a curious mind. And yet at times, the book does vex
with its sudden tangents and turns from one topic to the next.
The nine meditations adopt a methodological approach that stresses a world of
“concepts,” rather than “things,” where no concept can provide a universal, Archimedean
standpoint. Instead, Kratochwil insists, each concept only stands within a particular social
discourse (meditation 1). He then extends this perspective to scrutinize diverse theoretical
excursions into the role of law in international relations, ranging from the “concept of law”
(meditation 2); “constitutions and fragmented orders” (meditation 3); the role “of experts,
helpers, and enthusiasts”—from norm entrepreneurs to international judges (meditation 4);
the use of “metaphors and narratives” in framing issues around a “global community,” with
a critique of the flaws in Luhmann’s systems theory (meditation 5); the “shortcomings” of
the rather technocratic global administrative law project and the limits of calls for a
legitimizing role “of so-called civil society groups” (meditation 6); and rights discourses
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(meditations 7 and 8). Skeptical of each of these approaches, Kratochwil, in the end,
stresses the importance of practical reasoning leading to action (a decision), which affects
future practical reasoning, producing knowledge in a world of decision-making, called
“praxis.” In this way, we can go on, and, in doing so, “change the way ‘things are’”
(meditation 9) (at 25). And so the meditations turn full circle, in the biblical numerology
of nine with its Greek and Egyptian antecedents representing eternity.
Chapter 1 builds from his methodological work on the role of norms, including his
landmark book published the year the Berlin Wall fell, Norms, Rules and Decisions: On
the conditions of practical and legal reasoning in international relations and domestic
affairs (1989). In that book, Kratochwil critiqued rational choice approaches to knowledge
and called for a turn to praxis understood as knowledge developed through communication
within a community, grounded in situation-sense, which builds pragmatically on past
experience in view of future-oriented social purpose. In contrast to many international
law/international relations bridge-building exercises, in which international relations
theory becomes hegemonic in purporting to explain law, his work exemplifies the benefits
of a two-way flow of law and political science, because he takes legal norms and legal
reasoning seriously in shaping expectations and perspectives, and not just as exogenously
explained variables reflective of power and interest.
Chapter 2 takes us back to Kratochwil’s earlier explorations of the foundational
question of what is law, in which he responds, in the pragmatist tradition, that one cannot
answer the question from an Archimedean perspective since the concept of law is a human
one. He thus critiques definitions based on sanctions (such as Kelsen’s), on systems (such
as Hart’s), and on process (such as MacDougal’s), 3 while also rejecting post-modernist
indeterminacy in the work of Jacques Derrida and readings of Martti Koskenniemi’s From
Apology to Utopia. Rather, building on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s theory of language as
derived from use and as embedded in a practice community (or “form of life”), he sees law
as a form of “language” and a “practice,” involving a “tradition” based on a style of
reasoning which includes the use of particular “sources” (at 66–68). 4 That is the basis for
law’s status and role in the world.
In chapters 3–6, Kratochwil turns to evaluate new discourses and tropes in
international law theory, such as global constitutionalism and global administrative law.
Chapter 3 concerns the new constitutional discourse in international law theory that he
situates as a response to anxieties over fragmentation of the international legal order and
the proliferation of new functional international organizations, new issues (arising from
global interdependence and the externalities of decisions within nation-states), and new
instruments, such as soft law. Kratochwil dismisses this constitutional turn in legal theory
in light of peoples’ different cultural contexts, the lack of a global community, and the
feebleness of international political processes. Yet his own discourse goes further when he
appears to reject an enhanced role for international courts and international organizations
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in global governance because international political processes need first to develop further.
What is frustrating is that, by the end of this chapter we are left hanging, since we
understand the critique of the use of the constitutional trope as a dream of lawyers in
response to particular historical conditions, but we lack an evaluation of actual practice by
international courts and other actors, and processes of learning from that practice. These
practices should be studied as an (at least potentially) important development in the
creation of transnational legal order through praxis. 5 The type of legal order can be, and is,
subject to challenge; nonetheless, it remains a form of praxis within a broader pluralist
legal ordering involving different, interacting subject areas (such as trade, environment,
trade, finance, environment, health, human rights, culture, security) and levels of social
organization.
In chapter 4, Kratochwil turns to soft law and non-state actors whom he
sarcastically calls “experts and enthusiasts.” He understands their increased roles as a
response to growing complexity, but at the same time critiques advocates of these
developments for leaving politics out of the analysis. This chapter, as the others, is a great
read and is filled with insights, but it contains no real pragmatic engagement with problemsolving through soft law, which is an increasingly important form of praxis. Once again
the chapter exhibits a mocking disdain for legalists and adopts a “realistic” view, scoffing
at the pathology and naivité of outsiders dropping into Haiti or East Timor to solve their
problems only to be spurned by the local population for their privileges and to depart
leaving little positive impact.
Chapter 5 appraises the use of metaphors in international law doctrine and
discourse, such as the “progressive development” 6 of international law toward some global
community of humanity—constituting “humanity’s law” 7—which he critiques from the
perspective of praxis and the discrete, concrete, problem-solving work of norms and
decisions engaged with ever-new issues. Here he also criticizes Luhmann’s systems theory
for its functionalism and missing politics, as well as its reductive conception of law as a
binary code dividing the world into legal/illegal. Kratochwil provides examples of the
politics of law involving actors and practices at different levels of social organization,
citing Judith Resnik’s work on points of entry of the international into local spaces. 8 He
ends the chapter by once again disparaging legalists and their development of legal
doctrines such as jus cogens and erga omnes, which posit an international community that
does not exist, and he favors instead the concrete work of discrete problem-solving
informed by experience.
Chapter 6 turns its gaze to the global administrative law (GAL) project, and once
more is largely dismissive of it. Kratochwil correctly embeds the GAL project in the history
of the 1990s, a period characterized by economic liberalization, political transition after
the fall of the Berlin Wall, new international institutions, and rule-of-law movements. But
then he critiques the project for advocating universal principles that are decontextualized
and historically disembedded. GAL proponents, however, could fairly reply that GAL is
5
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context-driven in its response to particular historical and institutional developments; that it
is not an idealist project, but one aimed at making things better than they are. It is a
movement that engages with institutional developments and, to use Kratochwil’s own
terms, in praxis. GAL does not advocate a once-for-all, static model, but rather a mode of
engaging with existing institutions, stressing the importance of process and reason-giving.
Thus it can be viewed, like Kratochwil’s theoretical work, from the vantage of a new legal
realism whose two key components are empiricism and pragmatism, and entail learning
from experience.
In chapters 7 and 8, Kratochwil scrutinizes rights discourse. He applies the insights
of the later Wittgenstein to trace the historical emergence of rights claims out of
revolutionary politics, which discourse has now become a part of our tradition and practice.
As always, he is skeptical of any rights talk using universal or natural terms, and is
particularly hostile toward “juristocrats” usurping the power to pronounce in disregard of
politics and context. He stresses how rights rather “require a particular kind of politics” (at
229, emphasis added), and thus social institutions and “settled practices” (at 324). In
chapter 8, he explores the “grammar” of rights (which are “relational concepts”) in terms
of their historical sources in order to highlight the political, rather than to impoverish it (at
230–232). He stresses how rights claims involve correlate duties and tradeoffs that call for
balancing, as reflected in the doctrine of proportionality. Rights claims thus raise the
institutional question of who decides, which he scathingly contends, “cannot be left to some
juristocrats” (at 256–257). He reflects how a proliferation of rights, with their focus on
individual subjectivity, can undermine the res publica (at 255). He contends that we should
focus, as always, on the social consequences of such claims, raising once more the question
of the political.
Chapter 9 concludes with a meditation on “the bounds of (non)sense.” It is a
compelling meditation in which Kratochwil critiques ideal theory, from the early Rawls in
his Theory of Justice to the early Posner in his Economic Theory of Law. (Ironically, both
Rawls and Posner later abandoned their ideal theories and took a more pragmatic and
political turn closer to Kratochwil’s, and my own: Rawls in Political Liberalism and Posner
in a series of works leading to A Failure of Capitalism.) In contrast to ideal theory,
Kratochwil proposes praxis—a focus on problems and the tradeoffs among alternative
feasible solutions in which information can be updated based on experience. Here he cites
the pragmatist philosopher John Dewey’s critique of conceptions of truth (such as
libertarianism in Dewey’s time, reflected in neoliberalism in ours) and Dewey’s advocacy
of contextual problem-solving which allows learning to emerge. Kratochwil’s stimulating
excursus has much in common with what I have elsewhere termed a new legal-realist
approach to international law grounded in empirical study and pragmatist decision-making,
involving learning (what Victoria Nourse and I call “emergent analytics”) from
experience. 9 It is in that way we can best “go on with our individual and collective projects”
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(at 291), 10 modifying our means and ends in light of our experience and the ever-new
contexts we face.

3. Kjaer’s transnational constitutionalism
Kjaer, in contrast to Kratochwil, turns to the transnational with a focus on building
sociological theory of constitutional ordering beyond the nation-state. For Kjaer, such
transnational normative and constitutional ordering provides stabilizing mechanisms in a
world characterized by increased societal complexity and fragmentation. He has a common
starting point with Kratochwil in his grounding in historical developments and current
crises, and his insistence on the importance of problem-solving and inductive theory
building. 11 But their disciplinary dispositions take them in entirely different directions,
reflected in Kratochwil’s stinging criticism of systems theory.
Kjaer argues against methodological nationalism that views constitutions only in
relation to nation-states, and thus fails to see the nation-state as only one among many
forms of social organization. He immediately opens up a new world of theorizing, as
compared to Kratochwil’s engagement with conventional state-centered international law,
international relations, and constitutional and rights discourses. Kjaer reorients our critical
gaze. Unlike Kratochwil, he aims to build a coherent, all-embracing, general theory of
constitutionalism and different logics of normative ordering that span history and explain
our current conjuncture and future predicaments (at 7), an ambition that instinctively raises
the Kratochwilian skeptic’s critical eyebrow.
Kjaer works in the intellectual tradition of Luhmann, and he provides a
reformulated version of Luhmann’s systems theory by focusing on the emergence of
transnational, functionally differentiated, constitutionalized normative orders. Kjaer starts
his analysis by formulating three distinct organizational logics involving distinct normative
orders. The normative orders each consist of “a coherent arrangement of rules, reflecting
specific structures of expectations,” and they “are linked to the deployment of legal

be completely dissociated from normative and conceptual frames, while the
second pragmatic, conceptual dimension is infused with perceptions of
facts. They are also necessary complements in a world characterized by
dynamic change, since new empirical work and pragmatic practice are
always needed to address new factual contexts and new questions. Empirics
are needed to inform pragmatic decision-making, and the demands for such
decision-making inform the empirical questions asked. The two
components interact reciprocally to address law’s dynamic character.
See also Gregory Shaffer, International Law and New Legal Realism, in 2 STUDYING LAW GLOBALLY: NEW
LEGAL REALIST PERSPECTIVES (Heinz Klug, Elizabeth Mertz, & Sally Engle Merry eds., forthcoming 2016);
and Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can a New World Order Spur a
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sanctions as a means of establishing compliance” (at 65). 12 The three logics are: (i) the
territorial logic of the nation-state; (ii) the transnational logic of “functional
differentiation”; and (iii) the “traditional” logic of pre-modern, feudalistic-forms of
stratificatory differentiation, such as those based on class. Kjaer contends that today we are
at a tipping point where “the shifting balance between the nation-state layer and the
transnational layer indicates that the reliance on functional differentiation in world society
is deepening” (at 3), so that the “legal and the political systems are also in the process of
freeing themselves from their internal reliance on territorially delineated stabilization
mechanisms” (at 3). 13 Although Kjaer maintains that the three logics layer each other, and
that “the relationship between national and transnational structures is characterized by a
relationship of mutual increase” (at 8), he focuses his attention on the emergence of
autonomous, functionally differentiated, transnational normative orders, and pays no
attention to national ones, including the ways in which national and transnational orders
interact.
The book is composed of three parts broken into nine chapters. Part I addresses two
major “structural transformations” that give rise to transnational constitutional forms: “the
implosion of the Eurocentric world” (chapter 2) and “the multiplicity of normative orders
in world society” (chapter 3). Part II reconfigures concepts of law (chapter 4) and the
political (chapter 5) in this transformed landscape. Part III posits new “constitutional
stabilisation” devices that result from “the breakdown of constitutional ordering through
globalization-induced crises” (chapter 6), and are reflected in “the transmutation of
constitutional ordering” in Europe and “the global realm” (chapter 7). To understand the
response to these changes, he recalibrates “the constitutional concept” (chapter 8), before
concluding (chapter 9).
In chapter 2, Kjaer stresses that transnational ordering is not new, but previously
coexisted with colonialism, reflected in the center/periphery dichotomy in world systems
theory. 14 Europe has since declined as a world power, as has “the West” in relation to “the
rest,” reflected in the rise of the G20 following the 2008 financial crisis (at 20). Kjaer
contends that, today, the transnational is reflected primarily in fragmented international
and transnational organizations with distinct functional mandates playing roles analogous
to those of colonial empires. The fundamental question becomes for Kjaer “how society
can remain integrated under the structural conditions emerging from the increased primacy
of functional differentiation” in relation to nation-state territorial orders and traditional
stratificatory social orders (at 22).
In chapter 3, Kjaer starts with Luhmann’s concept of “world society” “understood
as consisting of communication,” which he contends has emerged relatively recently and
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“highlights the universal character of the world” (at 42). 15 While he finds the conception
of “world society” useful for challenging “methodological nationalism” across law and the
social sciences, he critiques Luhmann’s systems theory, including its reconstruction by
Teubner, for its positing of a common horizon for all communications because, for Kjaer,
the world consists of “a multiplicity of worlds of meaning” involving different normative
orders that produce “independent sources of meaning” (at 46). For Kjaer, it is these diverse
normative orders institutionalized in organizations that should be the “basic unit of study
for social sciences and law” (at 46), rather than the nation-state or the global. Kjaer thus
situates his approach between the extremes of Luhmann’s systems theory with its
universalist aspirations and Shmuel Eisenstadt’s cultural approach “which sees the major
civilisations of the world as the central units of study” (at 49). He aims to advance theory
that accounts for both horizontal differentiation among different systemic logics as in
Luhmann (law, politics, economy, religion, art, and so forth) and vertical layering between
the transnational, national and local, which thus provides for greater contextualization (at
50).
In Chapter 4, Kjaer conceptualizes law within and between normative orders,
building on concepts of the hybridity of law (involving the interaction of law and social
processes, giving rise to “living law”), fragmented law (along functionally differentiated
lines), heterarchical law (involving new multi-dimensional conflicts of law between statebased legal orders, functionally differentiated regimes, and diagonal conflicts across them),
and inter-contextual law (involving the interpenetration of different systems facilitated by
governance arrangements between normative orders). Kjaer distinguishes between the
internal and external dimensions of legal orders where the internal dimension serves to
ensure a “condensation” of norms, while the external dimension serves to establish
“compatibility” among normative orders, including national and transnational forms of
ordering (at 75–76). Transnational processes focus in particular on facilitating learning
through networks that help embed normative orders by enhancing their adaptive capacities
(at 77).
In Chapter 5, Kjaer develops a new understanding of politics in the transnational
sphere. He maintains that one cannot simply transfer standards of political legitimacy from
the nation-state level to the transnational level because they have different structural
contexts. He contends that the transnational level has developed functional equivalents to
key concepts such as the nation, the public sphere, and democratic representation, in the
form of stakeholders, transparency, and normative justification of decision-making (or
reason giving) through the self-representation of transnational organizations. 16 These
functional equivalents reflect a much more “cognitive-based administrative than
normatively driven political, rationality” (at 96), giving rise to new forms of technocratic
managerialism. 17 These are important insights for the study of transnational legal orders in
which transnational organizations seek to gain legitimacy through these means.
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Chapters 6–8 turn to the question of “how the constitutional concept can be reworked in order to correspond better to the current structural realities of world society” (at
103). These chapters are the most demanding in the book since Kjaer reconfigures
conventional understandings of the concepts of constitution, constitutionalism, and
constitutionalization. Part of the problem is that Kjaer does not fully develop his concept
of constitution until chapter 8, after having first built the historical and theoretical context
for his conception. The uninitiated reader thus waits for conceptual clarification which,
when it arrives, comes in obscure, abstract terms. For example, in his summary, Kjaer
turgidly explains:
From the theoretical framework outlined above, three core dimensions of a
mature constitutionalist order can be deduced. First, a constitutional order
is characterized by double reflexivity through a coupling between a
constitutional subject, in the form of a hierarchical organization which is
capable of reproducing an autonomous source of authority, and a
concordant legal framework. Second, constitutionalisation processes imply
a specific form of double prestation through a coupling between, on the one
hand, an internal reconstruction of an external constitutional subject within
the constitutional object, and, on the other, a register of legal rights,
establishing a framework for exchanges between the constitutional object
and the wider world as represented by the constitutional subject. Third,
constitutionalism, through the institutionalization of a double function, in
the form of principle-based and legally fortified quests toward universal
inclusion delineated along either territorial or functional lines, providing a
sense of direction in time through an articulated form of constitutional
consciousness. (at 148–149).
To put it more clearly for those not steeped in the Luhmann–Teubner–Kjaer line of
reflexive theorizing, he develops a broad conception of constitutions that includes the
institutionalization of functionally differentiated normative orders in organizations (at
128). These organizations are reflexive in that they operate under particular logics and
translate and process information from the external environment into their own terms. They
are, in system-theoretic terms, cognitively open to external information but normatively
closed in their communicative logics. His constitutional concept applies to “a whole range
of functional sub-systems, regimes, organisations, networks, professions and more or less
intangible components, all of which relate to each other in a multitude of ways” (at 110).
Kjaer contends that these transnational functionally differentiated constitutions operate
simultaneously with state-based ones, as well as traditional social orders. 18
These transnational constitutions, he contends, develop and change in response to
demands for functional differentiation to address societal complexity and “the looming
threat of social crisis” (at 113). Globalization and the West’s loss of dominance have
18
Kjaer correctly stresses that “the state has never been the sole source of authority, but has always been a
structure which has operated in a social environment . . . [involving] competing social structures” (at 28).
Yet, he conventionally calls pre-modern social orders static “household constitutions” that “was the single
most important structure for the integration of society in pre-modern Europe” (at 105). Military revolutions
gave rise to territorially differentiated modern bureaucratic state systems that in turn led to the territorial
constitutions of nation-states.
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triggered the fragmentation of normative orders, which include those of new countermovements (at 104 and 118). The world’s ongoing financial crisis reflects, in his words,
the lack of “adaptations and re-configurations of the institutional and, indeed, constitutional
framing of economic as well as other social processes” (at 128). He blames the crisis on
the “fundamentalist ideology” of neoliberalism that “seeks to impose a one-dimensional
economic logic on society in its entirety (at 116).
Chapter 7 addresses the “transmutation of constitutional ordering” in world society,
looking at the European Union (EU), global economic institutions such as the World Trade
Organization, International Monetary Found, World Bank, and International Organization
for Standardization, and counter-movements such as Fairtrade Labeling Organizations
International. These constitutional conglomerates consist of “a multiplicity of legally
framed, partly overlapping, and partly contradictory, orders” (at 128). They rely even less
on territorial differentiation than in the case of the EU, and they thus encounter even greater
challenges because of the heterogeneity of the social spaces affected by them. Kjaer
concludes the chapter by positing Fairtrade Labeling Organizations International as a
constitutionalized normative order because it is legally structured by a written
“constitution,” has a form of assembly engaging “stakeholders” with criteria for inclusion
and exclusion, a “judiciary” in the form of certifiers, and sanctioning mechanisms.
Chapter 8 provides an extensive re-casting of the concept of “constitution” in
sociological terms, concluding with the abstract language quoted earlier. Kjaer grounds
this concept in formal organizations that help stabilize today’s functionally differentiated
society. As Kjaer stresses, his “switch from a focus on the state to a focus on formal
organisations opens up a conceptual horizon which makes it possible to imagine quite a
radical expansion in the sort of organisations which can be observed through a
constitutional lens” (at 142). Internally, these constitutions govern the formal organization
of a normative order, stabilizing and safeguarding its autonomy and integrity by creating a
boundary between the normative order and its environment, criteria for inclusion and
exclusion, competences and procedures for decision-making, legal hierarchy, and a locus
of authority (at 141). Externally, these constitutions provide a mechanism for interaction
to facilitate compatibility with the wider society, including other segmented normative
orders within world society. Each constitution is future-oriented in that it is part of a “neverending quest towards the establishment of normative orders” (at 147).

4. A critique from the complementary perspective of transnational
legal ordering
Kratochwil and Kjaer theorize from two distinct disciplines—political science and
sociology—to address the role of law today. Kratochwil more conventionally addresses
public international law, and does not engage with the potential deep imbrication of such
law with national and local legal orders. In the end, it is not clear why he includes the term
“world society” in the title since not only is he deeply skeptical of the “cosmopolitan
project,” but the book’s index shows that he uses the term on only five pages within one
chapter, and he does so only in passing when he critiques Luhmann’s concept of “world
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society,” which he places in quotes to indicate his doubt (Kratochwil, at 44 and 231). 19
Kratochwil gives primacy to the political, and he expresses skepticism, at times verging on
mockery, of legal theorists who advance constitutional, global administrative, soft-law, and
rights-based prescriptions in light of the weakness of international political processes. He
concludes his tour d’horizon with a call for pragmatism and a focus on praxis.
Kjaer, in contrast, builds a new theory within the broader tradition of systems
theory, using the trope of constitutionalism to address the institutionalization of normative
orders through proliferating public and private organizations. He gives primacy to the
social, rather than the international and national, and theorizes the transnational realm as
characterized by functional differentiation involving autonomous normative orders. He
also does not engage with the mutual imbrication of transnational, national, and local legal
ordering. Thus, neither author addresses where, in my view, the action lies today regarding
the role of law in globalization and in response to perceptions of transnational problems,
which is in the recursive interaction of legal and political ordering among and between the
transnational, national, and local planes, which include public officials and private actors. 20
As for Kratochwil, I largely agree with the conclusions of his meditations and
appreciate their pleasant romp and conversational form. Arguably because we never arrive
at some promised land of theoretical closure, there is none of the boredom of Dante’s or
Milton’s descriptions of paradise. Rather, we encounter a rousing narrative winding along
a tortuous path. We are not out of the dark wood, but there is much illumination along the
way.
My primary critique of Kratochwil’s book is that his analysis never leaves the
international plane and thus fails to address the interaction of the international level with
national law and practice, which is central to the creation of order through law. That is the
very aim of international law today in its fragmented complexity. Kjaer’s book, despite its
grounding in systems theory which Kratochwil critiques for its elision of politics,
complements Kratochwil’s book by addressing transnational developments in legal
ordering across functional domains. Theories of transnational legal ordering and the
creation of transnational legal orders should build on Kratochwil’s insights by extending
them to the interaction of international, national, and local legal practices.
My second critique is that Kratochwil provides us with no clear conceptual tools
for the empirical examination of the role of law in international affairs today. Instead, he
criticizes legal projects for what he sees as ideal normative theorizing. However, at least
some of these projects view themselves as pragmatic endeavors calling for an examination
of praxis. I am particularly sympathetic to the global administrative law project, which I
view in terms of the development of new conceptual tools that can be pragmatically applied
in a dynamic fashion in order to address the spread of functional regimes that Kjaer
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theorizes in constitutional terms. 21 Ironically, Kratochwil argues against universalization
and deontology, and for the development of insights from practice, yet the book is written
from a bird’s eye view and with little guidance for empirical and practical engagement.
Finally, what is curious and paradoxical is that Kratochwil is a political scientist
who offers the possibility of a two-way bridge with legal scholars because norms and legal
practice lie at the center of his constructivist approach. Overall, however, he comes across
as rather disdainful of legal scholars, which is reflected in the repeated use of such terms
as “juristorats” to describe the field. 22 Yet there are many legal scholars who do not reduce
law to ideal theorizing and embrace the political not only in a materialist and
instrumentalist sense, reflective of international relations realism and rational
institutionalism, but also in a normative one. Such scholars should thus be naturally drawn
to Kratochwil’s work; this is especially true for those working in a new legal realist vein.23
Kjaer, in contrast, draws our attention to the rise and proliferation of transnational
organizations and situates his discussion in the context of current European and global
crises. He complements Kratochwil’s approach by expanding the scope of analysis to
transnational, functionally differentiated organizations. In doing so, he provides a graded
update to Luhmann’s and Teubner’s versions of system’s theory in transnational and
constitutional terms. Importantly, he breaks with Luhmann and Teubner in that he contends
that the power of the state is expanding both quantitatively and qualitatively in parallel
with functionally differentiated transnational legal ordering, rather than being in decline. 24
He argues that statehood and transnational ordering are not in a “zero-sum relationship,”
but in fact are “mutually constitutive,” reflected today in states’ “embeddedness in dense
and increasingly global governance networks” (at 31–32). 25 Like Teubner, Kjaer breaks
with Luhmann by theorizing constitutionalism in transnational terms, since Luhmann
implicitly viewed “the state and constitutions as identical” and defined the state as “the
structural coupling between law and politics” (at 109). Yet Kjaer differs from Teubner by
contending that transnational constitutionalism is best theorized as functionally
differentiated normative orders institutionalized in organizations, as opposed to a “societal
constitutionalism” involving functional systems operating as a whole, such as law, politics,
the economy, science, health, the media, sports, and so forth. 26
My critique of Kjaer’s book, besides the infelicitous language, is four-fold. First,
Kjaer continues an important line of theoretical exploration of constitutions in non-state
21
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terms. The challenge raised by much of this discourse, however, is what the particular use
of constitutional terminology brings to the analysis of the role, for example, of such
organizations as the International Organization for Standardization or Fairtrade Labeling
Organizations International. These organizations seem to lack the gravitas that the term
“constitution” evokes in most social discourse and practice. An alternative approach, one
that does not appropriate constitutional terminology, is to examine these organizations as
participants in the creation of transnational legal orders which both transcend and
encompass nation-states, and whose norms can become deeply imbricated within nationstates and social institutions. 27
Some may find that this critique is simply a matter of semantics. However, given
the legitimizing valence that goes with the term “constitution,” it is semantics with some
resonance for social communication and understanding. Kjaer (like Teubner) adopts
constitutional terminology, in part, in light of constitutional constraints on the exercise of
power (in this case, the power of functionally differentiated logics imperialistically
extending themselves). Yet the term “constitution,” in conventional discourse, also implies
that constitutional norms trump majoritarian democratic politics, so that law comes out on
top. Given the normatively closed nature of functionally oriented fragmented
organizations, and their domination in many cases by actors from the Global North, it is no
surprise that scholars from the Global South and outside of the discipline of law (such as
Kratochwil) rarely use such discourse. In other words, in practice, there is a risk that wellpositioned actors may use constitutional discourse to advance particular logics over others
in light of their interests and conceptions of problems, so that it is unclear that the use of
constitutional language would actually constrain organizations in the ways Kjaer (and
Teubner) advance.
Second, Kjaer deploys the functionalist logic of systems theory that is rightfully
criticized for eliding agency and power in its analysis. Kratochwil, for example, critiques
Luhmann’s systems theory for its lack of politics in focusing on functional differentiation
and evolution, and calls for an investigation of “the world political process rather than the
world societal process” (at 148). Certainly, Kjaer is correct in noting demands for
functionally differentiated organizations and stabilization mechanisms, but there remains
a peculiar lack of engagement with power, including state-based power, where the United
States and US non-state actors, and, to a more variable extent, the EU and European nonstate actors, play central roles in both bolstering and undermining international and
transnational regimes, from the World Trade Organization to the International Criminal
Court, the International Organization for Standardization, to fair trade labeling
organizations. 28 Functional differentiation can be examined simultaneously with agency
and power at the transnational, state, and local levels, as opposed to being analyzed only at
the transnational level apart from them.
Third, Kjaer stresses the “autonomy” of these constitutions, 29 but it seems more
profitable to address the interaction of these organizations with broader processes of
transnational legal ordering. For example, Kjaer contends that “multinational companies,
27
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globally operating law firms, think-tanks and leading non-governmental organisations are
increasingly operating as autonomous norm-producing entities outside the nation-state
framework” (at 4). Yet fieldwork indicates that, at least in many domains, these actors and
organizations are not simply autonomous: they lobby intensely and enlist nation-states, and
their norms reflect, adjust, and filter back into state law. State law also accommodates
them, and is thus often complicit in moves toward transnational legal ordering. 30 Nationstates and actors within them aim to export their legal norms to and through transnational
organizations, and these actors, in turn, bring home, adopt, adapt, and hybridize the norms
of transnational organizations. 31 Indeed, empirical work shows that even national
constitutions are not autonomous, but rather borrow and embed transnational legal norms,
such as international human rights norms. 32 It is this recursive interaction, involving
intermediaries and flows of legal norms, where much of the action is. Although it is true
that international organizations such as the World Trade Organization, and supranational
organizations such as the EU, cannot be viewed as “pure reflections of inter-state
bargaining,” they are also not (to quote Kjaer) “autonomous forms of social ordering which
constitute their own cognitive spaces on a global scale” (at 4). 33 As Joseph Weiler put it
decades ago, the EU is precisely international, supranational, and infranational, at the same
time. 34
Fourth, an important goal for developing theoretical frameworks is to orient and to
provide new means of engaging in empirical projects to better understand, explain, and
respond to developments in the world. A shortcoming of Kjaer’s book is the lack of
examples and guidance for engaging in empirical work. For instance, the only example of
a constitution that he discusses in any detail is that of Fairtrade Labeling Organizations
International. Yet, after he explains it, he concedes that “[t]he reconstruction . . . says little
about the actual effect of the Fairtrade Labeling Organizations International on global trade
flows, the environment and global health” (at 132). It seems odd to raise a single
organization as an example of the value of a new sociological approach without addressing
whether it has any social impact, and what that impact is. There are lots of parchments
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labeled “constitution,” but that does not mean they operate like constitutions—namely,
structure power and help create a sense of collective identity and social integration in any
meaningful way. International and transnational theorizing ultimately should help orient
empirical work and open new vistas for understanding and responding to order and disorder
in the world today. Otherwise, it risks methodological fetishism, tying itself up in its own
self-referential (reflexive) categories.
A fruitful way to build on Kratochwil’s and Kjaer’s insights is by fostering the
study of transnational legal ordering and transnational legal orders. 35 Transnational legal
orders extend beyond the domain of nation-states and the society of nation-states, studied
by Kratochwil, and engage with the transnational functional differentiation of society
theorized by Kjaer. They involve, ultimately, the study of praxis, emphasized by
Kratochwil, but extend that study to the interaction between transnational, national, and
local legal practice, involving public and private actors. Such an approach studies and
theorizes the framing of problems, the construction of legal norms, their propagation,
contestation, resistance, change, and impacts. It focuses not only on the international or
transnational level set off from national law and local practice, but also assesses the export,
import, interaction, settlement, unsettlement, alignment, and misalignment of national law,
local legal practice, and international and transnational legal norms. The work of
Kratochwil and his emphasis on praxis and that of Kjaer and his focus on functionally
differentiated transnational legal orders provide critical components for such analysis.
They complement each other in enhancing our understanding of international and
transnational legal ordering today in response to ever-new and ongoing global and
transnational problems and crises.
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